Klaus Meßerschmidt

Zeitschrift für Europäisches Umwelt- und Planungsrecht, Volume 19 (2021), Issue 3, Page 238 - 248

Emissions trading in the European Union and in Germany under the Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Act and the Fuel Emissions Trading Act does not adequately meet the demands of the economic model. In the "BEHG", a five-year inception phase of carbon pricing in the manner of a tax precedes emissions trading. In the EU Emissions Trading Scheme and the corresponding "TEHG", exemptions, especially the free initial supply of emission allowances (“grandfathering”), have limited the scope of the auction solution and postponed its start. However, even after the transition to auctioning, the contribution of emissions trading to allocation-efficient and dynamic environmental and climate protection remains below expectations due to the complex regulatory context and the volatile economic environment. Because of the limited role of trade in emissions trading, it is only a semi-economic annex to regulatory law. This increases the risk of undue burden on the sectors and households concerned.

Klaus Meßerschmidt

Zeitschrift für Europäisches Umwelt- und Planungsrecht, Volume 16 (2018), Issue 3, Page 336 - 343

The German endangered species protection law largely fails in curbing the risks of agriculture in the current biodiversity crisis. It fails to an extent that degrades it to symbolic law. Even after several attempts to implement the Habitats Directive, the current regulation is not in conformity with EU law. By its sentence 3, § 44 (4) BNatSchG places population protection of strictly protected species at the discretion of the administration. Despite some progress made, this constitutes a new circumvention of European standards. Incentive instruments can only partially compensate for the enforcement deficit of the regulatory law.

Guy Beaucamp, Klaus Hansmann, Boas Kümper, Klaus Meßerschmidt

Zeitschrift für Europäisches Umwelt- und Planungsrecht, Volume 16 (2018), Issue 2, Page 248 - 256